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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Brandon D G Parris appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a
controlled substance, challenging the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The district
court erred in denying Mr. Parris’ motion to suppress because the officer who stopped Mr. Parris
while he was riding his bicycle at night had reasonable suspicion to investigate his lack of lights
(an infraction), but never investigated that infraction. Instead, the officer detained Mr. Parris for
approximately 25 minutes while waiting for approval to search Mr. Parris and his belongings.
The district court erred in concluding the officer had, as an alternative basis for the stop,
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Parris had burglarized the Idaho Falls Zoo. The officer was on a
fishing expedition for drugs, and the drug evidence ultimately seized from Mr. Parris should
have been suppressed.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
At approximately 11:30 p.m. on September 11, 2017, Officer Brian Smith was on routine
patrol in Idaho Falls when he noticed a man, Mr. Parris, riding a bicycle without lights near the
intersection of Elm Street and North Ridge Avenue.1 (Tr., p.11, L.2 – p.12, L.9; R., p.114; Conf.
Docs., pp.21-22.) Officer Smith testified he stopped Mr. Parris because he did not have lights on
his bike, and he matched the description of a man who had burglarized the Idaho Falls Zoo.
(Tr., p.11, L.24 – p.12, L.16.) A video recording of the stop taken from the officer’s body camera
was introduced into evidence at the suppression hearing. (Tr., p.6, Ls.4-8; Defense Ex. 3.) The
video reflects that Mr. Parris told Officer Smith right away that he was on misdemeanor
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probation (for driving without privileges), and would not consent to a search of his backpack.2
(Defense Ex. 3 at 00:03-15; R., p.113.) The officer detained Mr. Parris for approximately 25
minutes while he tried to determine if he could search him and his belongings. (Defense Ex. 3 at
00:03-25:02.)
After approximately 21 minutes, Officer Smith received a phone call from Carol Martin,
the misdemeanor probation supervisor, who advised Officer Smith she would meet him and
Mr. Parris at jail with an agent’s warrant if Mr. Parris refused to consent to a search. (Defense
Ex. 3 at 21:15-25:02; Tr., p.15, L.16 – p.16, L.4.) When Officer Smith conveyed this information
to Mr. Parris, he consented to a search. (Defense Ex. 3 at 25:02-30; Tr., p.16, L.25 – p.17, L.3.)
Officer Smith found a knife and a small bag of methamphetamine in the pockets of Mr. Parris’
pants. (Defense Ex. 3 at 25:30-28:50; Tr., p.17, Ls.6-15.) When he found the drugs, Officer
Smith said, “That’s what I thought, see?” (Defense Ex. 3 at 27:30-33.) He said, “I’d love to share
with you how I knew that was going to be there, but—trade secret.” (Defense Ex. 3 at 24:45-50.)
Nothing relating to the zoo burglary was ever found on Mr. Parris or in his backpack.
Mr. Parris was charged by Information with possession of a controlled substance and
possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.43-45.) He filed a motion to suppress. (R., pp.80-86.)
The district court held a hearing on Mr. Parris’ motion and heard testimony from Officers Smith
and Martin. (Tr., pp.1-65.) The district court also considered multiple exhibits, including an
email and four photographs relating to the Idaho Falls Zoo burglary. (Tr., p.5, Ls.18-24; Defense
Ex. 1.) The district court denied Mr. Parris’ motion to suppress. (R., pp.113-27.)
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There was no testimony at the suppression hearing regarding the distance between where
Mr. Parris was stopped and the Idaho Falls Zoo. Appellate counsel used Google Maps to
determine the location Mr. Parris was stopped is approximately two miles away from the zoo.
2
Officer Smith testified the video started recording “maybe a minute or less” into the stop.
(Tr., p.20, Ls.10-18.)
2

The district court concluded Officer Smith “had reasonable suspicion to stop Parris and
investigate two suspected crimes: (1) riding a bicycle at night without proper lights and (2) the
zoo burglary.” (R., p.120.) The district court found Mr. Parris “resembled the suspected burglar
shown in the photos.” (R., p.120; Defense Ex. 1.) The district court rejected Mr. Parris’ argument
that Officer Smith extended the stop longer than necessary. (R., p.120.) The district court said:
If the only purpose for the stop was to fail to have lighting on the bicycle, then the
defense is correct in arguing that [the] stop was extended. However, as stated, the
stop involved two separate incidents (i.e. the lights and the zoo burglary). Because
the zoo burglary was one of the reasons for the initial stop, the stop was not
extended due to the zoo burglary investigation.
(R., p.121.)
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Mr. Parris entered a conditional guilty
plea to possession of a controlled substance, and the State dismissed the paraphernalia charge
and agreed to recommend probation. (R., pp.129-32.) The district court accepted Mr. Parris’
guilty plea. (Tr., p.73, Ls.5-6.) The district court sentenced Mr. Parris to a unified term of four
years, with one-and-a-half years fixed, and suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Parris on
probation for four years. (Tr., p.85, Ls.9-19; R., p.137.) Mr. Parris filed a timely notice of appeal
from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.140-43, 147-51.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Parris’ motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Parris’ Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Mr. Parris acknowledges Officer Smith had reasonable suspicion to stop him and issue

him a citation for riding a bicycle at night without proper lights, in violation of Idaho Code § 49723. However, Officer Smith never investigated Mr. Parris’ bike lighting, and never issued him a
citation. Instead, the officer detained Mr. Parris for approximately 25 minutes while waiting for
permission to search Mr. Parris and his belongings. This violated Mr. Parris’ rights under the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Officer Smith did not have reasonable
suspicion to believe Mr. Parris was the zoo burglar, and was instead acting on a hunch that he
had drugs. A hunch is not sufficient to support reasonable suspicion, and the district court erred
in denying Mr. Parris’ motion to suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
“In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,

the standard of review is bifurcated.” State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 (2009) (citation
omitted). “This Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous. However, this Court may freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional
principles in light of the facts found.” Id. (citations omitted). “At a suppression hearing, the
power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court.” State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562 (Ct. App.
2005) (citations omitted).
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C.

Officer Smith Abandoned The Traffic Investigation, Which Was The Only Legitimate
Purpose For The Stop, Without Reasonable Suspicion Of Criminal Activity
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right of every

citizen to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV. “Because a
traffic stop is limited in scope and duration, it is analogous to an investigative detention and is
analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).” State v. Danney, 153
Idaho 405, 409, 283 P.3d 722, 726 (2012) (citations omitted). “An investigative detention must
be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Id.
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Where officers abandon the initial purpose of a routine
traffic stop, “the extension must be justified by a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is
afoot.” Id. (citations omitted). “A reasonable suspicion exists when the officer . . . can articulate
specific facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably justify a
suspicion

that

criminal

activity

is

occurring.”

Id.

at

409-10

(citation

omitted).

“The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause but more than mere
speculation or instinct on the part of the officer.” State v. Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho 609, 615
(Ct. App. 2014) (citations omitted).
The district court acknowledged that, if the only reason Officer Smith stopped Mr. Parris
was because he was riding his bicycle at night without proper lights, “then the defense is correct
in arguing that the stop was extended.” (Tr., p.120.) The district court concluded the stop was not
extended, however, “[b]ecause the zoo burglary was one of the reasons for the initial stop . . . .”
(R., p.9.) Officer Smith could not lawfully extend the stop to investigate the zoo burglary
because he did not have reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. Parris was the zoo burglar. Officer
Smith had a hunch Mr. Parris had drugs, and a hunch is not a sufficient basis for a stop.
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1.

Officer Smith Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Believe Mr. Parris Was
The Zoo Burglar

Officer Smith testified at the suppression hearing that he received an email from a
detective describing the alleged zoo burglar, with four photographs attached. (Tr., p.10, Ls.1220.) This email was admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing. (Defense Ex. 1.) In this
email, Detective Lincoln McDonald provided some information about the zoo burglary, and
advised his officers to look out for “a white male in his 20s or 30s with a thin build” on “a BMX
style [bike] with a dark frame and light colored (possibly silver or chrome) front fork.” (Defense
Ex. 1.) This is the best of the four photographs attached to Detective McDonald’s email:

(Defense Ex. 1.)
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Officer Smith testified he looked at the photographs of the alleged zoo burglar “less than
seven days” before stopping Mr. Parris. (Tr., p.11, Ls.6-11.) He said “it was like five days or
something like that.” (Tr., p.11, Ls.9-11.) The district court made a factual finding that Mr. Parris
resembled the person shown in the photographs. (Tr., p.35, L.22 – p.36, L.12.) This factual
finding is clearly erroneous as it is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. See
State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 659 (2007) (stating a finding of fact is not clearly erroneous if
supported by substantial and competent evidence). “Evidence is regarded as substantial if a
reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point
of fact has been proven.” Miller v. Callear, 140 Idaho 213, 216 (2004) (citation omitted). There
is simply not enough detail in the photographs for a trier of fact to determine Mr. Parris
resembles the person photographed.3
Even if Mr. Parris resembled the person photographed, there was not a sufficient
connection between Mr. Parris and the zoo burglar to create reasonable suspicion that Mr. Parris
was the zoo burglar. Officer Smith testified he suspected Mr. Parris of being the zoo burglar
because he was on a bike, carrying a backpack, wearing a hoodie and a baseball hat. (Tr., p.22,
Ls.7-17.) Significantly, the email from the detective describing the zoo burglar did not refer to a
backpack, a hoodie, or a baseball hat, and it is not clear from the photographs that the suspect
was wearing a backpack, a hoodie, or a baseball hat. (Defense Ex. 1.) The detective advised his
officers to look out for “a white male in his 20s or 30s with a thin build” on “a BMX style [bike]
with a dark frame and light colored (possibly silver or chrome) front fork.” (Defense Ex. 1.)

3

Appellate counsel cut and pasted the image on the previous page directly from the exhibit
contained in the appellate record, located at Exhibit Volume 1, p.3. The quality of the image in
this brief is the same as the quality of the image located in the record, which is presumably the
same as the quality of the image considered by the district court.
8

Mr. Parris is a white male, but he was 43 years old at the time of his arrest. (Conf. Docs., p.2.)
With respect to the bike, Officer Smith did not testify that Mr. Parris’ bike matched the
description of the zoo burglar’s bike, and the district court did not make any findings regarding
the bike.
In State v. Kessler, our Court of Appeals considered whether there was reasonable
suspicion to believe the defendant was one of three males reported to have committed the crime
of breaking the window of a vehicle at an apartment complex. 151 Idaho 653, 654 (Ct. App.
2011). The Court set forth “a number of commonsense factors for consideration in determining
whether there exists reasonable suspicion that a particular individual was involved in a very
recent crime.” Id. at 655. These factors are:
(1) [T]he particularity of the description of the offender or the vehicle in which he
fled; (2) the size of the area in which the offender might be found, as indicated by
such facts as the elapsed time since the crime occurred; (3) the number of persons
about in that area; (4) the known or probable direction of the offender’s flight; (5)
observed activity by the particular person stopped; and (6) knowledge or
suspicion that the person or vehicle stopped has been involved in other criminality
of the type presently under investigation.
Id. (quoting 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(g), at 550–51 (4th ed. 2004)). The
Court explained these factors “are pertinent” because “they tend to limit focus to the universe of
persons who could have been involved in the reported crime and increase the likelihood that a
particular person was involved.” Id.
None of these factors support a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Parris was the zoo burglar.
He did not closely match the description of the offender; he was not found near the zoo or
leaving the zoo; he was not observed committing any suspicious activity; and he was not known
to the officer as being involved in any prior burglaries. Officer Smith did not have reasonable

9

suspicion to believe Mr. Parris was the zoo burglar, and the district court erred in concluding
otherwise.

2.

Officer Smith Had A Hunch Mr. Parris Had Drugs

What Officer Smith did have was a hunch that Mr. Parris had drugs. When Officer Smith
found a bag of methamphetamine in Mr. Parris’ pocket, he said, “That’s what I thought, see?”
(Defense Ex. 3 at 27:30-33.) He said, “I’d love to share with you how I knew that was going to
be there, but—trade secret.” (Defense Ex. 3 at 24:45-50.) This “trade secret” was a hunch—
nothing more.
Officer Smith lawfully stopped Mr. Parris after observing him riding a bicycle at night
without proper lights, but abandoned the legitimate purpose for the stop at the outset. The officer
did not have reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. Parris was the zoo burglar, and the prolonged
stop cannot be justified on that basis. Officer Smith had a hunch Mr. Parris had drugs, and “a
hunch is not sufficient to meet the stringent requirements of the Fourth Amendment.” State v.
Neal, 159 Idaho 919, __, 367 P.3d 1231, 1237 (Ct. App. 2016). The district court erred in
denying Mr. Parris’ motion to suppress.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Parris respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction, reverse
the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district
court for further proceedings.
DATED this 31st day of January, 2019.
/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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